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1.  Introduction 
Social and political theorists often talk of social structures, the positions of individuals within social 
structures, the effects of social structures.  Common examples of social structures include, on the one 
hand, broad and deep social phenomena such as the wage-labor system of industrial capitalism and the 
heteronormative and bionormative nuclear family, and on the other hand, much more local and flexible 
phenomena such as the social structure of a particular institution such as a school, church, or business.  
Needless to say, sociologists have a multiplicity of competing theories about social structures answering 
different questions.  However, many, including many philosophers, fail to notice social structures, and 
when structures are mentioned, will often find the idea mysterious. Their attention, including (and 
perhaps especially) their moral attention, focuses on individuals.   
My goal in this essay is to develop a philosophically useful account of social structure, drawing 
on recent work in the social sciences.  By “philosophically useful” account, I mean an account that will 
enable us to integrate attention to social phenomena more effectively in philosophical discussion.  This 
will include sketching a social ontology that connects social structures with structural explanation.   
Social structures are theoretical entities, postulated to do work in a social theory.  There are a 
variety of constraints on what they can be, given the work they are introduced to do.  For example: 
a) They are invoked in structural explanations; 
b) They enable us to identify and critique structural injustice; 
c) They provide the context for human agency; 
d) They are, in some sense and to some degree, constituted by relations between individuals. 
My focus in this paper is on (a).  The strategy is this.  I’ll begin by sketching an account of 
structural explanation.  I’ll then sketch an account of social practices and social structures.  The question 
before us is whether these two accounts mesh.  If the account of structural explanation is plausible, does 
the account of social structures I provide give us an understanding of how social structural explanation 
works? 




2.  Questions and the objects of explanation 
Suppose I am playing ball with my dog.  I stuff a treat into a hole in the ball and throw it for him.  
The ball goes over the lip of a hill and rolls down into a gully.  Why did the treat end up in the gully?  If 
we imagine the trajectory of the treat alone, from a space near my hand, through an arc the air, then 
landing about an inch above the ground and moving at about that height down the hill until it stops, it 
would be a huge task to explain the particular events that determined each of its movements.  A much 
easier explanation would be to point out that the treat was inserted into a ball that was thrown and rolled 
down the hill into the gully.  In this latter explanation, we explain the behavior of the treat by its being 
part of something larger whose behavior we explain.  
The explanation of the treat ending up in the gully by reference to the ball is not an inferior 
explanation to the more detailed one.  Rather, it is in many ways a better explanation.  For example, the 
explanation is more stable: although tracing the particular causal history of the treat’s movements down 
the hill gives us lots of information about that particular event, pointing to the treat’s being in the ball 
enables us to understand why the treat would have landed in the gully even if I had thrown the ball higher, 
or with a curve or spin, even if the hill had been a bit less steep, or the wind stronger.  The treat would 
have landed there even if it had been a different ball, made of a different material.  Moreover, insofar as 
explanations help us engage the world, the explanation relying on the ball’s movements is more useful: it 
provides a better model for seeing how I could intervene to prevent the treat from ending up in the gully 
(not throw the ball in that direction, for example, or catch up with the ball and stop it from rolling).   
This simple example is intended to show that sometimes it is good and useful to explain the 
behavior of a thing by explaining the behavior of something of which it is a part, if it is a part whose 
behavior is constrained by other parts of the whole.  If I had simply thrown a handful of treats in the 
direction of the gully, the fact that the treat in question was part of a handful of treats would do little or 
nothing to explain its movement because the handful is just an aggregate, not a structured whole.  The 
very idea of a structured whole is of something whose parts are interdependent.  Different structures will 
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have different effects on their parts.  If I had inserted the treat into a cube, it is very likely that the treat 
would not have ended up in the gully. 
Although structural explanations occur in many different domains, my concern is with social 
structural explanations.  Alan Garfinkel, (1981) offers a simple example to illustrate how structure can be 
not only explanatory, but serve in the best explanation: 
Suppose that, in a class I am teaching, I announce that the course will be “graded on a curve,” that 
is, that I have decided beforehand what the overall distribution of grades is going to be.  Let us 
say, for the sake of the example, that I decide that there will be one A, 24 Bs, and 25 Cs.  The 
finals come in, and let us say Mary gets the A.  She wrote an original and thoughtful final. 
(Garfinkel 1981, p. 41) 
 
Garfinkel argues that in this case, when we ask, “Why did Mary get an A?” the answer: “She wrote an 
original and thoughtful final” is inadequate.  Why?  Because in order to earn the single A, one would have 
to write the best final. If the instructor had not decided to grade on a curve, many students could have 
earned As by virtue of writing thoughtful and original finals.  Garfinkel says, “So it is more accurate to 
answer the question by pointing to the relative fact that Mary wrote the best paper in the class.” 
(Garfinkel 1981, p. 41)  Mary earned the A not simply by virtue of her performance, but by virtue of her 
performance in comparison with others and the particular grading structure that made the comparison the 
key factor in determining who earned the A. 
What is the role of the grading structure in this explanation?  On Garfinkel’s view, explanations 
are answers to questions, and questions establishe a contrast space for possible answers.1  In the case of 
Mary’s A in the class, there are several different questions, with different foci and contrast spaces.  In 
uttering: 
1) Why did Mary get an A? 
We might be asking,  
2) Why did Mary get an A (as opposed to a B or C)? 
or we might be asking,  
                                                      
1 It is perhaps obvious, but let me make explicit that throughout I am assuming an erotetic model of explanation, i.e., 
a model according to which explanations are answers to questions.  See Bromberger 1966; van Fraassen 1980; 
Garfinkel 1981; Risjord 2000. 
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3) Why did Mary (as opposed to Bob or Susan) get an A?   
As soon as we begin to list the contrasts, or ‘foils,’ it is clear that there are background assumptions that 
limit range of suitable answers.  An adequate explanation must find a relevant difference between the 
focus and the foils. (Lipton 1991)  If, instead of (3) we were asking:  
4) Why did Mary (as opposed to George Bush or Barack Obama) get an A?   
An adequate response might be that Mary was registered in the class and took the exam, whereas neither 
Bush nor Obama were.    
Garfinkel assumes that the correct answer to (1) must take into account the background facts 
about the curve and claims that “there is, therefore, an unexplained presupposition that there is exactly 
one A in the class” (Garfinkel 1981, p. 42).2  On his view, a better representation of the question would 
be: 
5) Given that the instructor is evaluating all and only the students in the class on an A-B-C grading 
system with A the highest and C the lowest and a curve that allows only one A, why did Mary get an A? 
 
To this question, it is clear that “Because she wrote a thoughtful and original final,” is inadequate, 
regardless of whether the contrast is between Mary and others in the class or between Mary’s earning an 
A or a different grade.  The correct answer is, “Because Mary wrote the best final in the class.” 
On Garfinkel’s account, the information included in the ‘given’ clause can serve two different 
functions.  First, it excludes a set of options that are not being considered relevant (in response to (2) only 
grades are relevant; in the case of (3) only the participants in the class who took the course for credit are 
relevant).  Second, it can structure the remaining options.  In the final exam example, the fact that the 
exam was graded on a curve structures the grading options so that only a certain distribution across the 
options is possible (1 A, 24 Bs, 25 Cs).  The limitation to these distributions is a feature of the world, not 
just a feature of the conversational context; and the adequacy of the explanation depends on whether it 
can differentiate the actual distribution from the other possibilities that have that structure. 
                                                      
2 The semantics and pragmatics of questions is far from clear.  However, Garfinkel’s claim that an utterance of (1) 
presupposes all that he packs into the “given” clause in (6) is not entirely plausible, given contemporary 
understandings of presupposition.  However, we need not assume that he had the more technical notion of 
presupposition in mind.   
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 Although explanations are answers to questions, not all questions are equally good at probing the 
phenomenon in question to get at a good explanation.  This is often because the questioner doesn’t have 
enough information about the events to ask a good question.  Good questions depend both on the issue the 
questioner has in mind, and also on the phenomenon being explored (Garfinkel 1981, p. 32, pp. 56-7).  
Compare (1) with a question that makes Mary’s singleton A explicit: 
6) Why did Mary (as opposed to Bob) get the A in the class? 
This is, plausibly, a better question, because it makes explicit that the range of possibilities that need to be 
ruled out concern comparative facts (it is not enough just to provide information about how well she did, 
but how it turned out that she earned an A and the others didn’t). 
 Let’s focus now on (6). There are two ways we might represent the contrast space for this 
question (Garfinkel 1981, p. 44).  On the first, we could consider the range of possible grades for each 
member of the class (the product of the individual possibility space for each member of the class = 350) 
and consider why it ended up that there was a single A granted to Mary: was her work so much better 
than everyone else’s?  Did the rest of them party too hard the night before the final?  But this would be a 
misrepresentation of the possibilities and the explanatory task, for in this class, the options were 
constrained so that only one person could earn an A.  On the second version, the contrast space consists of 
the various ways in which the students might be distributed according to the pattern of 1 A, 24 Bs, and 25 
Cs.  This is the appropriate representation of the space of possibilities in the case under consideration.  
Garfinkel calls such constraints on the contrast space structural conditions.  “In cases like these, the 
imposed structural conditions radically alter the kinds of explanations we give because they constrain and 
truncate the contrast spaces.” (Garfinkel 1981, p. 45)  The idea is that given our purposes and intentions 
in seeking the explanation, and the facts of the case, some ways of structuring the set of possible answers 
are better than others because of the possible outcomes. 
 What does this example show?  The first lesson is that an explanation is a response to a question 
that either implicitly or explicitly frames what is relevant for the purposes at hand.   This framing occurs 
through presuppositions, foci and contrasts.  Secondly, if there are conditions that structure the contrast 
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space (as in Garfinkel’s curve) so that only some possibilities are available, then an adequate explanation 
must be sensitive to this structure: the conditions define the set of competing cases that the explanans 
must rule out in order be adequate.   
 What does it mean, however, to be “sensitive to this structure?”  Let’s return to the example of 
the dog’s ball rolling into the gully.  We begin with a question: Why is the treat in the gully?  Our answer 
is in terms of the ball: I threw the ball in that direction and couldn’t get to it fast enough to stop it rolling 
(and the treat was in the ball). Even though we appear to be asking about the treat, the best explanation 
will be in terms of the system or structure of which the treat is a part, given that the treat was in the ball, 
this is how things unfolded with respect to the ball-with-treat-in-it.  In short, the treat wasn’t functioning 
independently.  The same might be said if we ask why Mary (and not Bob) earned an A.  To answer why 
she earned the grade she did, we need to point to the structure of which her grade was a part.  Given that 
Mary’s performance was graded on a curve so there could only be one A, Mary earned the A because she 
wrote a better final than Bob.  Mary’s and Bob’s grades were not independent.  The explanatory emphasis 
in each case is not the apparent subject of the question (Mary, the treat), but the whole of which the 
individual is a part (the movement of the ball, the instantiation of the constrained distribution of grades 
with Mary on top) of which the individual is a part.  The explanation of the relevant features of the whole, 
together with the fact that the individual is part of the whole, yields the answer to our question. 
Garfinkel emphasizes that when we are considering apparently competing explanations for a 
phenomenon, we must be very clear what is the proper object of explanation and whether or not the 
explanations have the same object.   Given the foregoing discussion, we should consider the following 
hypothesis: if a particular is part of a system or structure, then the best first step may be to indicate that it 
is part of the system or structure and proceed to explain the what’s up with the structure.  The explanation 
of the workings of the structure will be the best way to explain the behavior of its parts. 
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3. Structures, in general 
 It is often the case that we can explain the behavior of an object by reference to its parts: a plant 
grows towards the sun because the shady side grows faster than the sunny side; water boils or freezes 
because of the behavior of the molecules that compose it.  But as we have just seen, we can also explain 
the behavior of something by reference to the whole of which it is a part.  My dog Sparky’s tail is in the 
kitchen because he went there to see what was cooking; several dozen watermelon seeds landed on the 
deck because the watermelon they were part of fell off the picnic table. 
Structures, broadly understood, are complex entities with parts whose behavior is constrained by 
their relation to other parts.   Stuart Shapiro suggests: 
I define a system to be a collection of objects with certain relations. An extended family is a 
system of people with blood and marital relationships, a chess configuration is a system of pieces 
under spatial and “possible move” relationships…A structure is the abstract form of a system, 
highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do 
not affect how they relate to other objects in the system. (Shapiro 1997, p. 73) 
I take Shapiro to be suggesting that my family is a system that includes particular individuals (Steve, 
Isaac, Zina, Sparky, me) who stand in relations such as “parent of,” “child of,” “spouse of,” “dog of,” etc.  
But we can abstract from this particular Yablanger system to see it as instantiating a more general 
structure shared by other families.  We can then distinguish the individual in a system (me), from the 
position within the structure (parent, spouse). That is, considering the abstract relationships that form the 
structure, we can then distinguish occupiers of positions from the positions.  Shapiro offers this 
characterization of the difference: 
...there is an intuitive difference between an object and a place in a structure, between an 
officeholder and an office...There are, in effect, two different orientations involved in discussing 
structures and their places (although the border between them is not sharp)...We might say, for 
example, that the shortstop today was the second baseman yesterday, or that the current vice 
president is more intelligent than his predecessor...Call this the places-are-offices perspective. 
This office orientation presupposes a background ontology that supplies objects that fill the 
places of the structures. In the case of baseball defense and that of government, the background 
ontology is people; in the case of chess games, the background ontology is small, movable 
objects—pieces with certain colors and shapes. (Shapiro 1997, p. 82) 
In contrast to this office orientation, there are contexts in which the places of a given structure are 
treated as objects in their own right...We say that the vice president is president of the Senate, that 
the chess bishop moves on a diagonal, or that the bishop that is on a black square cannot move to 
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a white square. Call this the places-are-objects perspective. Here, the statements are about the 
respective structure as such, independent of any exemplifications it may have. (Shapiro 1997, p. 
83) 
So considering a family structure with places for parent and child, we can consider the places as offices 
for individuals – I occupy the position of parent – or we can treat the nodes or positions in the structure as 
objects themselves – parents are responsible for their children.  Considering places as objects, we ignore 
the individuals that occupy the place, and focus on the relationships that hold between the places.  I’ll use 
the term ‘node,’ e.g., the parent node in the family structure, for places-as-objects. 
Notice, however, that if we distinguish the occupiers of positions from positions (nodes), then if it 
is given for the purposes of an explanation that an individual occupies a node in a structure (the dog treat 
in the ball, Mary being graded on a curve), the constraints defined by the structure’s internal relations 
matter in explaining the facts in question.  The object of explanation becomes the node rather than the 
occupier of the node.  The space of possibilities for the occupier of the node, qua occupier, is limited by 
relations internal to the structure.  In Garfinkel’s terms, the structural conditions on the object, considered 
as occupier of node, require us to shift the proper object of explanation. 
In explaining why the dog treat rolled down the hill, it doesn’t matter whether it was bacon or 
beef, crunchy or chewy; it does matter that the ball containing it was round. Without knowing the shape 
and weight of the ball, the slope of the hill, etc. we won’t be in a position to explain – in a stable and 
helpful way – the eventual position of the ball/treat.  In explaining why Mary earned the A, it doesn’t 
matter where she was born, who her parents were, or what she had for breakfast: what matters is that only 
one A was possible, and her final was better than all the others.  Even when questions direct our attention 
to the occupier of the position as the object of explanation (why did this treat travel down the hill in the 
way it did), the best answer to the question may be in terms of the structure the object occupies.   
In short, sometimes our explanatory needs are very specific and we are concerned with a 
particular token event; a fine-grained grid will demand precise explanations, but the explanations are 
relatively unstable – minor changes in the sequence of events would render the explanation inapt.  In 
other cases we are concerned with an individual as an example of a type, and the type is defined by 
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reference to the node the individual occupies in a structure.  Such explanations will abstract away from 
certain features of the individual and allow for “inessential perturbations” in the sequence of events.  As a 
result the explanation will apply more broadly and be more stable.  Moreover, once we identify the 
structure that constrains the behavior of the individual, we can ask new questions, demand further 
explanation: why is the individual within this structure? Why does this structure/set of relations exist, 
rather than that? 
 
4.  Dretske on structuring causes 
Fred Dretske has also been interested in different levels of explanation in explaining the behavior 
of  individuals.  He draws a distinction between triggering causes and structuring causes.  Dretske 
discusses, in particular, the causes of behavior, which he takes to be a process originating in an “inner 
state” C, and resulting in a bodily movement M.  Although for our current purposes, we don’t need to 
constrain the ‘C’ and ‘M’ in this way, his model is useful. 
In looking for the cause of a process, we are sometimes looking for the triggering event: what 
causes the C which caused the M.  At other times we are looking for the event or events that 
shaped or structured the process: what caused C to cause M rather than something else.  The first 
type of cause, the triggering cause, causes the process to occur now.  The second type of cause, 
the structuring cause, is responsible for its being this process, one having M as its product, that 
occurs now…There is a clear difference between explaining why, on the one hand, Clyde stood 
up then and explaining, on the other hand, why what he did then was stand up (why he stood up 
then).  He stood up then because that was when the queen entered, or when he saw the queen 
enter, the room.  He stood up then as a gesture of respect.  The difference between citing the 
triggering cause of a process (the cause of the C which causes M) and what I have been calling its 
structuring cause (the cause of C’s causing M) reflects this difference… (Dretske 1988, pp. 42-3, 
my italics) 
In more general terms, supposing C to be a cause and E and effect, if 
C causes E. 
Then C is the triggering cause of E.  But we may also want to know what causes [C causes E], i.e., what 
causes the process of which E is a part.   
7) Why is it that [C causes E] rather than [C causes E’]?   
Dretske suggests that to answer (7) we need to find the structuring cause.  
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Whether we cite the triggering or structuring cause in an explanation will depend on what 
question we are asking and the contrasts and presuppositions of the question.  Using Dretske’s example, 
we might ask: 
8) Why did Clyde stand up when the Queen entered? 
With several different contrasts in mind: 
9)  Why did Clyde stand up when the Queen entered, i.e., just then (as opposed to moments before or 
moments after)? 
 
10) Why did Clyde stand up (as opposed to stay seated, take off his hat, clap his hands) when the Queen 
entered? 
 
11) Why did Clyde (as opposed to others in the room) stand up when the Queen entered? 
To answer (9), Dretske suggests, we must give the triggering cause, i.e., the event(s) that caused Clyde to 
stand.  But in response to (10) we should give the structuring cause.  Presumably this would be to situate 
Clyde within a social structure: Clyde is Queen Elizabeth’s subject (he is a part in a larger whole).  
Locating Clyde in a structure, we shift our attention from individuals to nodes: subjects are required as a 
matter of etiquette (the structural conditions that limit the possibilities for nodes in the structure) to stand 
when the Queen enters.  This is not a quirk of Clyde’s: generally subjects of the Queen will stand up 
when she enters the room, given the relations between Queen, her subject and the rules of etiquette.3  
Once we make explicit the background structure that constrains a subject’s (in this case, Clyde’s) 
behavior, we can then ask, why is standing up the polite thing to do?  And why are there Queens and 
subjects at all? 
 So it appears that structures are important to explanation because they constrain behavior of 
individual things insofar as they occupy nodes in the structure.  The structure does not simply provide 
background conditions for the events in question (the standing), for it is the workings of the structure that 
are sometimes the proper object explanation:  Why stand?  Why these constraints?  Why these nodes?  
Why this structure here?  Questions about nodes in structures are the proper subject matter of social 
                                                      
3 There are additional questions to be asked here, e.g., doesn’t the explanation of Clyde’s standing depend on his 
knowing the rule of etiquette and his seeing the Queen enter?  If so, does the explanation revert to a psychological 
explanation?  This will become relevant below. 
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science, for it is types of individuals, types of action, etc. that are of primary interest.  This suggests that 
there need be no competition between a triggering cause and a structuring cause: both what they explain 
and how they explain differ.4 
5.  Social Structural Explanation: The Invisible Foot  
 Within the philosophy of social science there is a longstanding controversy over whether all 
explanation must be “individualistic.” (Recently, Pettit 1993; Udehn 2002; List and Spiekermann 2013; 
Epstein 2009; Epstein 2014.)  Although it is controversial what individualism requires, the general idea is 
that in order to explain the behavior of agents, the explanans must ultimately be in terms of their (perhaps 
idealized) psychological states.5  As Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit point out, individualists take the basic 
problem with structural explanation to be that: “...it is far from clear how most of the factors invoked in 
structural explanations are supposed to affect individual human beings, in particular to affect them other 
than by coming into their consciousness and constituting covertly (sic?) microexplanations” (Jackson and 
Pettit 1992, p. 110).6   
Let’s consider a potential social structural explanation in detail:  
12) Why do women continue to be economically disadvantaged relative to men?   
We might restate this with an explicit foil as follows: 
                                                      
4 There is much more that needs to be elucidated about the phenomenon of structural explanation.  I remain 
confused and have not yet even taken advantage of the many suggestions offered to me at the Oberlin Colloquium.  
For that I apologize. 
5 The psychological states in question are typically of a rather narrow sort.  Jackson and Pettit, along with rational 
choice theorists, think the relevant psychological states are beliefs and desires, and the ability to act on belief and 
desire is what constitutes autonomy. (See Jackson and Pettit 1992, p. 104.)  This seems to rule out explanation in 
terms of sub-intentional or sub-personal states.  No reason is provided for doing so.  Not all individualisms assume 
that the micro-explanations will be in terms of psychological states. The more general thesis is that all social 
phenomena can be explained in terms of the properties, states, and relations between individuals: “Crudely put, 
methodological individualism is the thesis that good social-scientific explanations should refer solely to facts about 
individuals and their interactions, not to any higher-level social entities, properties, or causes.” (List and 
Spiekermann 2013, p. 629.) 
6 Although Jackson and Pettit (1992) are sympathetic to some forms of individualism, they argue that their own 
account of program explanation provides a model that reveals the validity and interest of at least some forms of 
structural explanation. I find their characterizations of program explanations inadequate, but I won’t get into the 
controversies over program explanations here.  (See Walter 2005, MacDonald and MacDonald 2006.) 
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13) Why do women continue to be economically disadvantaged relative to men (as opposed to reaching 
economic parity with men)? 
• Biologistic explanation: women are innately disadvantaged in comparison with men in what it 
takes (intelligence, competitiveness, etc.) to be successful in high paying jobs. 
• Individualistic explanation: women, more than men, prefer to spend time with children over 
being in a high-paying job (...fill in relevant beliefs and desires), so they choose to forego 
economic success for the benefits and pleasures of motherhood. 
• Structural explanation:  Women are positioned in a self-perpetuating economic structure that 
systematically disadvantages them.  
Here is one elaboration of the structural explanation: 
The Invisible Foot (Okin 1989, Cudd 2006): Imagine a couple, Larry and Lisa, who, we suppose, 
are equally intelligent, talented, educated, and experienced in the workplace; they have equal 
power in their relationship, have no prejudices about gender roles, and are equally capable of all 
domestic tasks and childrearing tasks.  Larry and Lisa decide to have children; baby Lulu arrives.  
They live in a community where decent childcare is beyond their means.  Moreover, let’s suppose 
that in this community, as elsewhere, there is a wage gap: women, on average, make only 75% of 
what men make.  Under these conditions, unless Larry and Lisa have special reasons to think that 
they are unusual in their earning capacities, it is reasonable for Larry to work full-time and for 
Lisa to make adjustments in her work, e.g., to work part-time, to take time off, to take a less 
demanding job.  But in our society, “wealth determines power, domestic work is unpaid, and 
divorce laws do not evenly divide wealth.” (Cudd 2006, p. 149)  So Larry accrues greater human 
capital and ends up with more power in the relationship.  Moreover, insofar as Larry and Lisa are 
typical, women on average will be poorer risks for employers who will “tend not to trust that 
women will stay with their careers or that if they do, they will devote the kind of time and energy 
to them that men will.” (Cudd 2006, p. 149) As a result, “women’s jobs” that require less 
commitment, mobility, and experience will pay less, and women will have to prove themselves 
exceptional to be considered for high paying “men’s jobs.”  As a result, the pattern is reinforced. 
(Cudd 2006, pp. 148-151) 
Arguably, the invisible foot is a form of structural injustice, and it is a kind of injustice that does not 
become apparent when considering only biologistic or individualistic explanations.  In particular, the 
explanation focuses on Lisa and Larry as nodes in a structure, rather than simply as individuals with 
certain personal deficits or tendencies.   
 Let’s consider how one might structurally explain Lisa and Larry’s behavior: 
14) Why did Lisa quit her job (rather than Larry)? 
15) Why did Lisa quit her job (rather than find a different solution to the childcare problem, e.g., go part 
time, rely on grandparents, or excellent affordable daycare....)? 
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Plausibly, if we were looking for the triggering cause of Lisa’s quitting her job, we could point to a 
decision she made to do so, e.g., Lisa’s decision to quit her job caused her to quit her job.  To gain 
insight, at least we have to consider further the beliefs and desires that gave rise to the decision: Lisa 
decided to quit her job because she believed that it would be best for her family, and wanted what’s best 
for her family.   
Notice that this psychological explanation, (even if we offered even her more explicit reasoning), 
doesn’t provide a very good answer to either (14) or (15).  To answer (14) it is not enough to say that Lisa 
quit (just) because she wanted what’s best for her family.  That would be comparable to saying that Mary 
earned the A in Garfinkel’s class just because she wrote an excellent final (ignoring Bob’s performance 
and the curve).  The fact is that Lisa quit her job because she chose to and Larry didn’t also choose to quit 
his job.  It is a background structural constraint that they both can’t quit, and so Larry’s behavior, their 
relationship, and the limited options available are crucial to explaining her action.  As before, it seems 
better to shift the object of explanation to the structure: Why did Lisa end up in the gully (so to speak)?  
Because Lisa is part of a system that includes Larry, her employer, etc., and given that Larry wasn’t going 
to quit, the employer wasn’t going to provide childcare, and she couldn’t just leave Lulu home alone, this 
was her only real option.   She might have made a rational choice to quit, but it is inadequate to just point 
to her choice as if it occurred independently of the workings of the system. 
Moreover, to answer (15) simply in terms of Lisa’s choice to stay home with Lulu is inapt.  The 
possibility space for childcare is severely limited in Lisa and Larry’s situation; there are structural 
constraints that make only some options genuine possibilities.  Her desires were “canalized” by the 
circumstances, because she occupies a node in a social structure.  This is compatible with her action being 
rational, and autonomous.  Clyde was a free agent when he chose to stand when the Queen entered.  But 
insofar as he was the Queen’s subject and followed the rules of royal etiquette, he had no choice but to 
stand.  Qua subject, qua node in the structure, standing was his only option.; seeing him as subject 
explains his action.  Similarly, qua mother/spouse in a highly constrained social structure, quitting is 
Lisa’s only real option.  Lisa is part of that structure, and that’s how the structure works.  As individual, 
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Lisa could have behaved otherwise – she could have left Larry and Lulu – but as mother/spouse in the 
system, that was not an option.  
The fact is, of course, that Lisa quit her job rather than Larry because Lisa is a woman who 
occupies the wife/mother node in a problematic structure of family/work relations.  The structure within 
which she and Larry live combines facts of human (infant) dependency, a stable framework of gender 
relations, and a particular wage-labor system. These structural constraints limit the possibility space – this 
choice architecture – for both Lisa and Larry; the differences in what is available to them, given their 
gender, is crucial for explaining what occurs.  Moreover, the explanation illuminates normative 
dimensions of the circumstances that would otherwise be missed.  Given only the biologistic or 
individualistic explanations, the fact that women remain economically disadvantaged relative to men 
appears not to be a matter of moral or political concern: if the best explanation of women’s choices to 
forego economic success is that they, as individuals, desire to be caregivers of children (and the elderly), 
this is a choice we must respect.  No intervention in the name of justice is called for, except possibly the 
gender disparity in wages that is built into the scenario.  The structural explanation reveals, however, that 
there is a deeper problem than the wage inequity.7  The “invisible foot” explanation shows that women as 
a group are structurally situated so that it is rational for them to choose options that keep them 
subordinate. (In raising the issue of subordination, I assume, with Okin (1989), that the partner in a 
relationship who earns less, has less work experience and credentials, and who identifies with norms of 
care will be disadvantaged with respect to exiting the relationship, so will be vulnerable to exploitation 
and abuse).  Without the structural explanation, injustice is obscured. 
The focus on structural constraints provides resources for capturing significant regularities: those 
whose choices are similarly constrained will tend to act in similar ways, even if their personal histories, 
psychologies, and attitudes differ, e.g., Lisa and Mona may make similar choices re childcare even if they 
grew up in very different circumstances and are psychologically different in many other ways.  So even if 
                                                      
7 Thanks to Edmund Flanigan for urging me to highlight this point. 
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in Lisa’s case the structuring cause is mediated by her beliefs about what options are available, the social 
structure is both a key factor in explaining her beliefs, and the pattern of women’s choices, i.e., the 
choices of those who are situated at the same node in the structure.  This, ultimately, is what is at issue in 
the original question (12): why do women continue to suffer economic disadvantage relative to men?  
Abstracting from Lisa’s and Mona’s particular psychologies recognizing that they function at a node in a 
structure enables us to provide an explanation that applies to anyone occupying that position.  This offers 
a more stable explanation, as we discussed above. 
6. Social structures 
So in order to play the right sort of role in structural explanation, social structures must impose 
constraints on our action: they provide us positions/offices within a set of relations that constitute the 
structure.  I will sketch some broad outlines of the approach I favor.  (See also Haslanger 2012, Ch. 15, 
17; Haslanger 2014b.) 
a.  Social Relations and Social Practices8 
There are many constraints on action (physical, biological, psychological).  How does a social 
structure constrain us?   If physical, biological, and psychological constraints are the only forms of 
constraint, then it might seem that we are forced back to a kind of individualism: assuming that social 
structures don’t constrain us physically or biologically, they must do so by virtue of our attitudes about 
them.  Or as Jackson and Pettit suggested: social factors affect individuals only by “coming into their 
consciousness and constituting covertly (sic?) microexplanations”  (Jackson and Pettit 1992, p. 110).  One 
model is that social constraints function through norms and have their effects by creating social 
                                                      
8 I’m not going to be able to give a theory of “the social,” or what makes something “social.”  I think it is unlikely 
that there is a non-circular definition; the best we can hope to do is give a focal analysis that treats certain cases as 
central for the purposes of the account and explains how other cases are related.  For my purposes, the central cases 
of sociality are not, e.g., a couple taking a walk together (Gilbert 1992), or social groups such as committees or 
corporations (List and Pettit 2013), or social institutions (Searle 1996).  I’m currently inclined to take certain social 
practices (though not in McIntyre’s (1981) sense) to be the central phenomenon as suggested below.  On core-
dependent homonymy see Shields (1999) and Haslanger (2014a). 
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expectations and anticipation of blame and praise. (Bicchieri 2006, p. 11; cf. Martin 2009, pp. 6-7).  This 
model of social constraint, however, is inadequate. 
Social structures, as I understand them, are networks of social relations. These include relations 
between people: being a parent of, being an employee of, being a spouse of; they also include relations to 
things: cooking, owning, occupying, driving, eating, herding. Social relations, in turn, are constituted 
through practices.  Our practices relate us to each other and to the material world; they situate us at nodes 
in the structure.  Consider cooking: 
Cooking rice is an instance of a more general practice of cooking, and regular engagement in the 
practice is constitutive of a social role: cook.  Being a cook relates one in specific ways to other 
persons (not only the customer or family, but also the farmer, grocer, garbage collector, sources 
of recipes, including traditions, cookbooks, etc.), and also relates one in specific ways to things 
(foodstuffs, sources of heat, water, utensils).  Cooking is only possible within a social structure 
that provides the ingredients, skills, tools; the norms for taste, texture and ingredients; the 
distribution of labor of cooks and consumers, etc. 
What is a practice?  Social practices are, in the central cases (though not all cases), collective solutions to 
coordination or access problems with respect to a resource.9  The solution consists in organized responses 
to the resource.  
Borrowing from contemporary anthropology (and social science more broadly), I have proposed 
this hypothesis (Haslanger 2012, Ch. 15, Ch. 17): 
Practices consist of interdependent schemas and resources “when they mutually imply and sustain 
each other over time.” (Sewell 1992, p. 13; my italics)   
Schemas consist in clusters of culturally shared concepts, beliefs, and other attitudes that enable us to 
interpret and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and affect.  Schemas are public – think 
of them as social meanings conventionally associated with things in our social world, including 
language10 – but are also internalized and guide behavior (Howard 1994; Hollander and Howard 2000).  
                                                      
9 I borrow from Lewis (1969) and others.  However, practices are not always conventional, in Lewis’s  sense.  They 
may not be arbitrary; there may not be, in any meaningful sense, common knowledge among participants; the 
responses may not be rational or mutually advantageous.  Importantly, a meaningful sense of preference with respect 
to the resource in question may be constituted only through the practice that organizes our responses.  
10 This is not to say that “social meanings” in this sense should be understood as lexical meaning or semantic 
content.  I take them to function pragmatically.  See (Haslanger 2014b). 
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Both concepts and beliefs, in the sense intended, store information and are the basis for various behavioral 
and emotional dispositions.  Although schemas are variable and evolve across time and context, their 
elements are sticky and resist updating.  Resources are things of all sorts – human, nonhuman, animate, or 
not – that are taken to have some (including negative) value (practical, moral, aesthetic, religious, etc.).  
On this view, a practice exists when there are public schemas for interpreting, conceptualizing and 
responding to resources, and such resources are utilized and modified in order to fit the schemas.  
Individuals participate in practices, sometimes intentionally and knowingly, sometimes not, if their 
behavior accords with the schemas in engaging with the resources. 
In social reality, schemas and resources are both causally (“sustain each other”) and constitutively 
(“mutually imply”) interdependent.  Consider food, e.g., corn:  
An ear of corn can be viewed as something to eat, as a commodity to be sold, as a religious 
symbol.  In other words, we can apply different schemas to the object, and the schemas frame our 
consciousness and evaluation of the object.  The different schemas not only offer modes of 
interpretation, but license different ways of interacting with the corn.  Actions based on these 
different schemas have an effect on the ear of corn qua resource, e.g., it might be cooked for 
food, or the kernels removed to be shipped, or it might be dried and hung in a prominent place to 
be worshipped.  The effects of our actions then influence the schema.  If the corn sells for a good 
price, its value is enhanced and the farmer may seek ways to grow it more efficiently, possibly 
investing in new and different varieties. 
Causal interdependence: schemas emerge and develop in response to resources and resources emerge and 
develop in response to schemas.   
Constitutive interdependence: a schema for X is a way of collectively interpreting and organizing 
information about X’s qua resource.  Schemas are constitutively defined by the resources they organize, 
and something’s being a resource of a particular kind depends on what schema interprets/organizes it. 
 
b.  Social constraints? 
How do practices, then, impose social constraints?  At least three kinds of factors condition 
engagement in a practice, e.g., my dinner making: 
Personal attitudes, habits, dispositions; both mine and the personal attitudes of those I interact with. 
Resources: the materials/tools available (Note that materials/tools may also include skills, time?). 
Schemas: the collective concepts, narratives, expectations, of those in my cultural milieu.  
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Both schemas and resources constrain and enable my action: I’m not going to cook idli if I don’t know 
what idli are, if idli are just not what we eat, if I don’t have an idli steamer or the ingredients, whereas I 
will cook pasta because it is what we eat, I have a box on the shelf, a way to heat water, and a colander. 
It might seem plausible to say that schemas are what socially constrain us.  Perhaps resources 
impose physical constraints, personal attitudes impose psychological constraints, and shared schemas 
impose social constraints.  But how do schemas constrain?  If schemas are internalized and govern action 
through individual psychology (admittedly, not just beliefs and desires, for schemas affect perception, 
attention, cognitive associations and involve other sub-personal processes), again we seem to be left with 
familiar individualistic explanation.11   
However, remember that structural constraints need not be a matter of causal processes that 
trigger action; social constraints set limits, organize thought and communication, create a choice 
architecture; in short, they structure the possibility space for agency.  (See also Satz and Ferejohn, 1994.)  
Elucidating this possibility space and the position of an individual within the structure of that space, can 
explain their behavior.  (Think of Mary and Bob in Garfinkel’s class, Clyde and the Queen, Lisa and 
Larry.)  Even if individual psychology provides triggering causes of our choices and actions, what we do, 
and what we can do, depends on social structure within which we act.  The structures socially constrain 
our behavior by making certain kinds of things available (or not), e.g., childcare centers, idli steamers; by 
providing templates of interaction that favor (or discourage) certain forms coordination with respect to a 
resource, e.g., share, hoard, distribute; and by canalizing our attitudes accordingly. 
In short, structures beyond my attitudes and the attitudes of others create my choice architecture: I 
can’t cook idli without an idli steamer.  This is not just a physical constraint, but also a social constraint: 
the artifact is not available to me in my social milieu. What food I prepare is constrained both by the 
                                                      
11 Mark Risjord (2000) argues convincingly, however, that even claims about norms often do not reduce to claims 
about individuals alone: “In general, when a norm is invoked to explain a group-level phenomenon, there will be 
structural conditions in the social context and structural presuppositions to the why-question.  Regardless of their 
personal history, individuals in the group mostly end up in the same place.  Not all joint possibilities of individual 
belief or action are real possibilities for the group.  Models for behavior are invoked precisely because a regularity is 
found among the dispositions, beliefs, etc. of individuals.  Therefore, explanations that invoke norms to explain 
group-level phenomena will not generally be reducible to individualistic explanations.” (p. 160) 
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social materials available and the social meanings/schemas, over and above the physical objects and 
individual attitudes.  Such meanings are not up to the individual agent but depend on collective 
understandings and the resources that have been organized by those understandings.  The options are 
constituted through our practices, i.e., the interdependence of schemas and resources. 
We are constrained in many ways in acting: physically, psychologically, and socially.  The 
constraint is social, I propose, when we occupy places in a structure, and the relations constituting the 
structure are relatively rigid due to the interdependence of schemas and resources.  The materials and 
meanings that together make up our social world are not alterable simply by my thinking or intending 
otherwise, or by my individual action alone.  What I do, and what I can do, is socially constrained. 
Pointing to these constraints can be, depending on the question, explanatory. 
8.  Conclusion 
Social structures consist in a network of social relations, some of which are to other people, some 
of which are to non-human animals, some to things; some are conscious and intentional (marriage), some 
are not (consumer vulnerability, racial privilege).  Although I have not explored different kinds of 
structures in detail, or the different ways in which structures are constituted, it would appear that 
offices/nodes in a structure of relations may be related causally (unemployment/crime), constitutively 
(what it is to be a rook is to be governed by the rook rules), or regulatively (how a subject should behave 
in the presence of the queen).  Resources, including material objects, mediate our relations to each other 
within a structure. In an important sense, we organize ourselves around resources.  The resources, not 
only schemas, structure our behavior – one cannot prepare idli without an idli steamer or ride a bicycle 
without a bicycle.  My actions are my own, triggered by my thoughts, desires, goals.  However, the 
resources I rely on and the meaning of my action are not mine alone but depend on the structure I’m part 
of.  Illumination of these structures is important for explaining human action. 
I have argued that an explanation of individual action in structural terms situates individuals 
within “offices” or nodes in a structure.  We explain the behavior of the individual given their place in a 
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structure.  This offers insight into why the particular individual behaved as he/she did, but it also 
contributes to our understanding of the individual as the instance of a type – a type defined by the 
conditions for existing at that node.  By carving the explanadum across a broader range of possibilities (as 
a type, not a token), we can achieve better, more stable, explanations.  Moreover, by identifying the 
structure within which action occurs, we can also call for an explanation of the existence and shape of the 
structure.  Structural explanations should not be avoided, or merely tolerated.  They should be sought, for 
they are in many ways preferable to individualistic explanations. 
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